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Democracy and Bolivian Sovereignty

DEMOCRACY AND BOLIVIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MORALES
ERA

ERIN LEICK
Department of History, University of Nebraska at Kearney
Mentor: DR. ROGER DAVIS
ABSTRACT
In late 2019, Evo Morales was forced out of office as the President of Bolivia and charged
with sedition and terrorism. Morales had spent more than two decades as an indigenous and
cocalero activist, then served as President for nearly fourteen years. During this time, he and the
Bolivian Movement Toward Socialism party, the MAS, oversaw a new constitution with the goals
of supporting Bolivian sovereignty and democratic ideals. Morales’s version of democracy,
though, is intertwined with sovereignty, and centered on increasing the rights of the indigenous
peoples who brought him to notoriety. This paper seeks to determine the extent to which Morales
succeeded based on a sampling of policies put into place during his tenure. These evaluations will
demonstrate that while Bolivian systems have moved toward democracy and national sovereignty
under Morales, his own actions undermined that progress. Morales’s commitment to his
indigenous identity and vision of himself as an indigenous leader caused him to work against his
own stated aims of democracy and sovereignty.

In 2006, after a successful campaign touting his indigenous roots and cocalero background,
Evo Morales took office as the Bolivian President. Morales was aligned with the Bolivian
Movement Toward Socialism party, the MAS. The primary goals of both the MAS and his
presidency were improving indigenous conditions and reducing reliance on the United States. Over
his tenure, these very same goals would lead Morales to enforce unpopular policies and the oncepopular leader lost strength. Further costing him the favor of his citizens, Morales refused to step
down based on the new constitution he helped install, and complaints of voter fraud grew rampant.
In late 2019, he was forced out of office and charged with sedition and terrorism. After the fall of
Morales, world powers including the US and UK have shown support for Jeanine Añez as the new
president of Bolivia, suggesting that Morales’s efforts at establishing Bolivian sovereignty may be
a thing of the past, but its democracy appears safe.
This paper will examine Morales’s policies during his presidency to determine the extent
to which they (1) support Bolivian sovereignty and (2) support democratic ideals. Based on these
policies, Morales’s record on multiple issues will be evaluated: indigenous rights, coca production,
land use, resource nationalism, and foreign involvement. These evaluations will demonstrate that
while Bolivian systems have moved toward democracy and national sovereignty under Morales,
his own actions undermined that progress. Over the course of his presidency, Morales’s
understanding of principles of democracy and sovereignty based in his indigenous identity caused
him to stray from the true meanings.
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In order to support this thesis and analyze how successfully Morales supported Bolivian
sovereignty and democracy, it is first important to define the elements of democracy for the
purposes of this analysis. Since the revolution of 1952, myriad Bolivian leaders have worked
toward democracy in the nation. Henry Veltmeyer and Juan Tellez’s history of Bolivian politics
explain the country’s trajectory in the years before Morales rose to power:
The transition toward democracy in Bolivia has been characterized above all by the search
for a new economic, social, and institutional order… each political party and social
organization engaged in the battle for democracy had a different view, and vantage point,
even a different concept of democracy. But, notwithstanding this ideological diversity,
there was a general consensus as to the need to reform and modernize the state. 1
The first of two key elements of Morales’s term, and this essay, is Bolivia’s progress toward
democracy under his leadership. To evaluate Morales’s commitment to democracy in Bolivia, the
guide will be the criteria Scott Mainwaring establishes for evaluating Latin American democracies:
(1) political offices resulting from competitive elections, (2) broad adult suffrage, and (3) respect
for civil liberties along with the protection of minority rights.2
Bolivia established universal suffrage in 1952, but the new constitution of 2009 provides
an opportunity to examine weak spots and how Morales tried to safeguard suffrage and minority
rights. A major part of Morales’s platform centers around indigenous rights and tracking changing
attitudes during his terms in office will demonstrate his commitment to democracy. Morales was
a player in elections in Bolivia from 2002-2019, so the events leading up to the 2005 election will
also provide important context for this analysis.
The second key element of this analysis is establishing Bolivian sovereignty. For Morales,
Bolivian sovereignty is rooted in reducing foreign influence in the country, reducing power of the
large estates in favor of individuals, and ensuring sustainable development. To achieve the MAS’s
desired "Honourable, Sovereign and Productive Bolivia for Living Well,” Bolivia needed to reduce
the presence of oil companies by nationalizing the industry; 3 create and sustain “productive
development . . . for the eradication of poverty”; 4 protect Bolivian land for Bolivian farmers and
ensure those farmers can provide food for the country “so as not to depend on donations.”5 Beyond
the party platform, Morales’s statements before he took office demand change: a new constitution
with natural resources “in the hands of the Bolivian people" and a desire to “‘de-neo-liberalize’ all
basic services.”6
Morales’s rise can be characterized as part of a grassroots indigenous movement, but this
paper will examine how it continues from a top-down position. His popularity with the people was
evident in the year prior to his inauguration, and long before: “His image appeared on all campaign
propaganda and in some cases the words ‘Evo Presidente’ dwarfed the name of the party itself.” 7
As he took office, “the movement is top-heavy, its power concentrated in its leader.” 8 Morales
claims to be a representative of the bottom, but a linear approach will demonstrate that his policies
maintained this top-heavy approach, further concentrating his own power with a new constitution
and his ultimate attempts to dismiss the provisions that tried to reign him in. Overall, this paper
will show how Morales’s policies caused Morales’s declining popularity and resulting efforts to
maintain power.
Examination of the arguments from the groups silenced in this environment will also be a
key element of analysis. Morales is often painted broadly, either as just another radical left-wing
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populist by detractors or fawningly without significant analysis by his supporters. “Many analysts
have heedlessly replaced careful examinations of empirical reality with casual celebration of press
releases issued from the presidential palace of Evo Morales.” 9 For instance, in “A Populism of
Indignites,” Marten Brienen argues that Morales’ popular public speeches do not necessarily
reflect his actual policies: “While he has talked at length about socialism and railed against
capitalism, no significant reforms of the economic system—such as significant income
redistribution—have been proposed, let alone implemented, under his administration.” 10 This
insight on the difference between Morales’s speeches and his actions can be seen throughout his
presidency.
BACKGROUND
Evo Morales has created a powerful image of himself as a man of the people, focusing on
his humble origins. Indigenous and cocalero are two words never far from his name, and it seems
that any piece seeking to tie them into his policies would be remiss to not include a reference to
his fashion choices. Like the missing necktie and occasional football jersey, it is the reality of this
life that informs his policies: nationalization of natural resources, land redistribution, protected
coca production, and reducing foreign dependence to promote wealth inside Bolivia.
Juan Evo Morales Ayma was born in rural western Bolivia in October 1959. His family
were poor, Aymaran subsistence farmers in an area rich in indigenous tradition and customs,
including the communal ayllu. 11 He attended secondary school but did not finish, and did not attend
university, instead serving in the army. His service coincided with a time of instability in Bolivia,
with five presidents in two years, including two military coups. After his service, storms destroyed
much of their land.12 He and his family left their ancestral home on the Antiplano and settled in
Chapare, in the Tropic of Cochabamba, to expand beyond subsistence farming, purchasing land
for a fruit farm that eventually transitioned into coca production. 13
The land in the Chapare region offered titled lands under control of a local sindicato. Once
a tool of land distribution, the coca boom in the latter twentieth century and subsequent migrant
influx expanded the organization’s role. The migrant influence resulted in a union-like, quasigovernment structure responsible for local sindicatos’s organization, crop diversity, education,
infrastructure, socialization, and other local government tasks. 14 In order to possess a title, Morales
had to join the sindicato.15 Morales’s first post within the organization came several years later in
1983, when he parleyed his interest in football into a position as secretary of sports. He rose up
quickly: he was elected sindicato leader in 1985 and became a federación leader in 1988, at just
29 years old.16
From 1988 to 2005, Morales fought for campesinos rights in the Bolivian Congress and
through the MAS. He was jailed several times for his activism and rose to prominence, the result
of which included a surprisingly successful second place showing in the 2002 presidential election.
During this time, Morales proved himself dedicated to the campesinos and their causes, unwilling
to align himself with other parties. Biographer Martin Sivak explains that through his travels
Morales became convinced that “campesinos would vote campesino” in Bolivian elections, which
justified his loyalty to their cause. 17 He drew the attention of national figures and international
governments, leading to increased “democracy promotion” by the United States, who courted
several other parties and potential leaders over concerns about the rise of Morales and the MAS.18
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Morales’s 2005 victory was dependent upon a broad base of support from the indigenous,
the campesinos, and workers; he and MAS earned support by promoting their rights. These
supporting groups had long felt suppressed by Bolivian policies, and MAS provided an
instrumento político to channel their power. Morales referred to his position as a leader for
indigenous Bolivians in his inaugural address, saying “We have been condemned, humiliated ...
and never recognised as human beings,” as well as “We are here and we say that we have achieved
power to end the injustice, the inequality and oppression that we have lived under.”19 Morales’s
identity as a man and a politician is as much a product of his heritage as it is his history, a “fluid
relationship between the class and indigenous identity.”20 These groups “shared a common hostile
view of western globalization, capitalism, and neoliberalism, but lacked any larger representation
before the emergence of MAS.”21
Evo was born several years after the 1952 Revolution expanded constitutional rights to
include universal suffrage, but the rural setting in his formative years meant that “the health
policies of the 1952 Revolution, which also brought universal suffrage, nationalization of the
mining industry, and agrarian reform, never made their way out to those confines. Neither did
electricity, gas, or drinking water.” 22 The injustice of life as a poor farmer, and later a cocalero,
formed the heart of his policies during all of his time in office.
Farming has also influenced his views on Bolivian sovereignty. Upon arriving in the tropic,
the family also took part in a larger deforestation in order to turn their plot into arable land. That
plot was large enough to sustain fruit farming. In his 2011 book Evo Morales and the MAS, Sven
Harten argues that “[Morales’s] experience in the fertile yet commercially underexploited Tropic
nevertheless comes to the surface in his economic policy when he talks about the ability of smallscale farmers to make Bolivia self-sufficient in food.”23 Supporting small campesinos rather than
commercial farmers reflects his own background.
The direct democracy at work in the sindicato informed Morales’s leadership style as well.
These meetings, where any member can express an opinion before the whole group comes to a
consensus, both trained and influenced Morales. One goal of the meetings were the “facilitation of
communication between leaders and the grassroots… an essential prerequisite of making informed
decisions,” and one he continued by meeting regularly with grassroots organizations. 24 Meetings
in this style also gave him the ability to speak persuasively to those who may not agree with him. 25
However, this system can also be viewed in a less positive light; these meetings can look like
“consultations” that result in “both clientelism and favouritism.” 26
Looking at Morales’s terms of success for himself are an important indicator of what is
guiding him. In the sindicato, leaders are judged by “how well they generate consensus, articulate
the views of the grassroots at other levels, and facilitate communication with other
organizations.”27 Even upon leaving office in 2019, Morales expressed an attitude similar to that
of a potential sindicato leader in stubbornly justifying his actions: “I did not look for the
candidacy. . . The organisations of the popular struggle asked me to be the candidate.” 28
Evo Morales ran for President in 2005 as the Movement Toward Socialism candidate. He
was part of a broader movement of left-leaning candidates that made up the South American “pink
tide" of the early twenty-first century. On election day in December 2005, nearly 85 percent of the
population voted and gave Evo Morales a popular mandate. 29 Predictably, the MAS had
widespread success in the countryside, but they also appealed to “the informal urban proletariat of
the suburban slums and older working-class barrios of the major urban centers.”30 This broad base
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led to 53.7 percent of the vote for Morales, a thirty-point increase over his total in the 2002 election,
and the first absolute majority in a presidential election in more than forty years—but did not quite
hit his own goal of 60 percent. 31
Often missing from this success story is a mention of the role that Morales played in the
unrest in the half decade before he took office. With a goal of "the refounding of Bolivia, [and] the
transformation of the economic model and political system," he called for significant changes to
the Bolivian system that would require immediate action as a leader. 32 His platform proclaims a
commitment to the country and its resources: ''The time has come to change this terrible history of
looting our natural resources, of discrimination, of humiliation, of hate, of despise.'' 33 Positions
like this made him a popular candidate, one with his finger one the pulse of the Bolivian people.
No one can deny Morales’s charisma—talk of “Evoism” was already heard in 2007. 34 The
danger of a cult of personality can have ramifications for the country’s politics, though. Marten
Brienen argues that the populist elements that allowed Morales’ meteoric rise are the same
elements undermining his government. He points out that popular ideas may not consider the
reality or the best interests of the state, and summarizes that “popular power, then, is a doubleedged sword in Bolivian politics: while it has allowed the marginalized a political voice, it has also
served to undermine the political stability the country needs for long-term growth.35 Combining
the pro-Evo attitudes of Bolivians with the populist leanings of a new leader had the potential for
serious political ramifications.
2006 HYDROCARBON “NATIONALISM” AND RESOURCE NATIONALISM
Coming off a half-decade of conflict over national resources, Morales’s swift movement
on nationalizing hydrocarbons is unsurprising. On May 1, 2006, Morales issued Supreme Decree
No. 28701 and took control of the country’s oil and gas fields. In announcing the move, he
proclaimed, "the time has come, the awaited day, a historic day in which Bolivia retakes absolute
control of our natural resources…The looting by the foreign companies has ended." 36 This is an
early example of the difference between Morales’s hardline rhetoric as an activist that was tamed
by the realities of the presidency. In late 2005, he claimed that "the state is under an obligation to
have total control over the hydrocarbons, and that includes a political position, commanding
respect for the constitution and the struggle of the Bolivian people." 37 However, his decree stopped
short of expropriation; Morales instead imposed a 180-day deadline for foreign companies to
renegotiate their contract or leave. 38 Despite protests from the corporations and countries impacted,
many chose to meet Bolivia’s demands. 39
The issue that emerges from Decree No. 28701 is Bolivia’s resource nationalism. Brienen
describes this concept as “rooted in the imagery of the ‘beggar on a throne of gold.’”40 Morales’s
explanation of poverty in the midst of natural wealth is supported by the poverty facing many in
Bolivia—64 percent when he took office. 41 In 2005, he pointed out that "Many families still cook
with . . . wood, with hay. This is absurd and unjust." 42 He later made clear his belief that Bolivians
should be prioritized, stating that "the Bolivian people cannot live on top of gas but without gas .
. . our domestic market will be supplied with cheap gas." 43 This people-first stance drove the
hydrocarbon decree, and gives support to Morales’s conception of ruling in the name of the people.
Many of Morales’s biographers, and those evaluating his actions in real time, emphasize
his connection with his background while reporting his actions as leader, essentially framing a topdown narrative as a time of success for those on the bottom. The 2005 election and this policy are
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two early examples of Morales’s success framed as indigenous success. Recognizing this
dichotomy is necessary to understand analysis of the former President.
In their article “Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia,” Nicole Fabricant and Nancy Postero
explain that “in contrast to the long history of natural resource extraction—first by the Spanish
conquistadors, then by white-mestizo elite, and finally by transnational corporations—the MAS
state promises to construct a new form of justice based on redistribution of resource wealth to the
indigenous and poor.”44 Morales blames colonialism and foreign interests for the condition of his
constituents, with the foreign looting of natural resources a continuation of Latin America’s “open
vein.”45 Reversing this trend was key to his understanding of his mandate, and supports
Pevehouse’s findings on the democratic nature of leaders who have risen from regional
organizations. Morales had significant support from the cocaleros and faced potentially high
“audience costs” for not following through on his promises—resulting in rapid action on at least
one campaign promise.46
Historians also recognize the more complicated economic issues at play in Bolivia.
Brienen, for instance, does not argue that exploitation is not a factor, but does point out that
hydrocarbons alone are not the answer to Bolivian poverty. 47 Taking over the gas and oil reserves
brought a significant amount of land and money into the hands of the state—based on a global
increase in commodity prices.48 This provided an opportunity for Morales to increase his own
power at the expense of Bolivia’s democracy, which would be in line with Jan Teorell’s
characterization of “the anti-democratic effect of natural resource abundance” in his Determinants
of Democracy.49
Though there have be questions of his handling of the state lands (see below), overall
Morales has avoided the lure of the “rentier state” and worked with the private sector and
transnational corporations to do the extraction that Bolivia does not have the resources for.50 With
increased value of Bolivian hydrocarbons, the government had money to spend on the poorest
citizens.51 The result is economic stability and popular support for his 2009 and 2014 elections,
despite widespread criticism. 52
Even with competitive elections in Bolivia, the structure of the government meant that
Morales often governed by decree—as he did with hydrocarbons. As outlined above, historians
see this early action as in line with popular thought. Based on the popular desire underlying the
decree Morales issued, this decision does demonstrate progress toward democracy. The
hydrocarbon decree and early actions on national resources also support his desire for Bolivian
sovereignty. Though he did not fully remove transnational corporations and foreign influence, he
did force recertification of the business terms in a way that would keep the majority of profits in
Bolivia. Overall, he made progress toward reducing dependence and ensuring Bolivian
sustainability.
2009 CONSTITUTION, INDIGENOUS IDENTITY, AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
Another key of Morales’s activism was the creation of a new constitution, one which would
highlight the power of the people as the owners of natural resources and beneficiaries of state
wealth.53 After making progress on hydrocarbon nationalization, he began quickly with the
formation of a constituent assembly, and the three-year process culminated in a referendum to
adopt the constitution of 2009. These two elements demonstrate significant participation in the
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constitutional process, and were designed to continue under constitutional governance with its
inscribed tools of direct democracy.54
The preamble lays out Morales’s agenda:
We, the Bolivian people, of plural composition, from the depths of history, inspired by the
struggles of the past, by the anti-colonial indigenous uprising, and in independence, by the
popular struggles of liberation, by the indigenous, social and labor marches, by the water
and October wars, by the struggles for land and territory, construct a new State in memory
of our martyrs.… We have left the colonial, republican and neo-liberal State in the past.
We take on the historic challenge of collectively constructing a Unified Social State of
Pluri-National Communitarian law, which includes and articulates the goal of advancing
toward a democratic, productive, peace-loving and peaceful Bolivia, committed to the full
development and free determination of the peoples… with power originating from the
people, demonstrate our commitment to the unity and integrity of the country. We found
Bolivia anew, fulfilling the mandate of our people, with the strength of our Pachamama
and with gratefulness to God. 55
Especially significant to Morales’s positions is the overt inclusion of Pachamama alongside the
Christian God. Coca also finds a place in the document, with a declaration of its “cultural
patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia, and as a factor of social
unity.”56 Indigenous rights are specifically outlined throughout the massive document, something
that Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl argue “may signal deeper indigenous participation in the
state but without changing the structures of the state itself.” 57 Almut Schilling-Vacaflor points out
the contradictory nature of the new constitution “pushing forward participatory mechanisms”
while simultaneously increasing executive power.58
There was rarely a mention of Morales in the run-up and aftermath of his 2005 election
that didn’t include a reference to his unusual dress—traditional indigenous clothing and motifs
were omnipresent. The day before his official inauguration, he walked barefoot to the temple at
Tiwanaku and was proclaimed “president of the indigenous peoples of the continent.” 59 He and
others spoke to the importance of that day to the next 500 years of Latin American history—after
500 under oppression, this was the time for taking power.60 His indigenous and cocalero roots are
a key element of his political persona and inform many of his policies, especially the constitution.
The concept of indigenous identity comes to the heart of Morales’s movement on
democracy—one that may determine whether he is making progress or simply repeating the
patterns of Bolivia’s past. Pamela Martin and Frankie Wilmer’s 2008 comparative analysis of
Bolivia and Ecuador explains that the “fluidity between the campesino and indigenous identity is
not uncommon in Bolivia where campesino activists are also primarily indigenous.”61 His efforts
to advance the cause of the indigenous of the Chapare is one area that opens his actions up to
criticism. According to Thomas Grisaffi, the complex relationship between indigenous groups in
Bolivia is complicated by the colonizer status of main groups of the Chapare, the Amaya and
Quechua peoples.62 This likely led that indigenous-campesino “fluidity:”63 as the challenges to the
campesino status and coca rights of the “originarios” was challenged by those “from here” (the
lowland Yungas), the new indigenous identity returned their “inalienable right to cultivate coca
leaf because they are originarios.”64 As Margaret Poulous explains, the former president’s policies
strip ancestral coca zones of their protection from forced eradication and “appease foreign
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concerns surrounding legalized coca, while addressing the needs of his primary constituents in the
Chapare.”65 Those constituents, like Morales himself, are the modern-day colonizers.
Given the colonist overtones of Morales’s past and his overt displays of indigeneity,
Brienen’s characterization of him is apt: a leader who “who employs the symbolism of anticolonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric to engage in dramatic displays of defiance and resistance.”66
Morales’s own actions before and after his election belie the dramatic side of his activism. Prior
to his election, Morales took a hardline stance against the United States— “Long live coca, death
to the yankees” was once his signature cry at the end of his speeches67—but from the Burnt Palace
Morales talked of compromise. This change in rhetoric supports Jeffrey Webber’s argument that
the MAS policies with Morales at the helm are actually a reflection of continuity in Bolivia rather
than the radical change they claim. 68 This is another example of the difference Breinen points out
between Morales’s speeches and actions.
When Morales announced that Bolivia's indigenous “had earned their right to hold political
power via the elections ‘as owners of this land,’" 69 he echoed Eduardo Galleano’s 1973 sentiments
that the people of Latin America continue to claim their “natural right” to the land. 70 This
ownership is part of the decolonization rhetoric Morales often uses, set in a desire to return from
the 500 years of oppression. As part of this effort, Morales opened a Ministry for Decolonization
upon taking office, with a mission described as the conversion of the state “into an expression of
our identity and our traditions.”71 However, interviews conducted by Linda Farthing and Benjamin
Kohl in Evo’s Bolivia point to a complication of this attitude. As one Guaraní Bolivian said, “we
find that what is being offered by the government is an increase in indigenous perspectives from
the highlands rather than a focus on our own [Guaraní] heroes and stories.” 72 Despite the “plurinational” focus of the constitution and modern thought, Morales seems to be leaning closer to a
nationalistic model, with a homogenous indigenous identity. 73
Morales’s commitment to the cocaleros has created what Charles Hale calls the “indio
permitido” and Fabricant and Postero set up as a struggle between “good Indians” and “bad
Indians.”74 Morales has always been clear on whom he represents: “If we win, not just Evo will be
president, but the Quechua and Aymara will also be in the presidency.” 75 But while he represents
the two largest indigenous groups, others are not only left out of his efforts, they tend to be the
“bad Indians” and among his antagonists.
Writing in 2005, Pablo Stefanoni and Hervé Do Alto were optimistic about Bolivia’s “new
nationalism” and its “peasant and indigenous masses who were advancing a new idea of
‘Bolivianness’ that was anti-colonial, multi-cultural and inclusive.”76 The previous governments
had been run by a white-mestizo class, and the regimes promoted a “homogenous mestizo cultural
ideal. This ideal appropriated important aspects of Indian culture. . . to give it ‘authenticity’ and
roots, but the European stock provided the guarantee that it would be modern and forward
looking.”77 Schilling-Vacaflor explains that
Until recently democracy represented an exclusive and discriminatory pact of the ruling
elite and that many times the rule of law primarily served the interests of the rich. . . Many
members of indigenous-campesino sectors of society may now be unwilling to fully respect
governance models which in the past served to repress their aims of emancipation, and
which were perceived as externally imposed (neo)colonial or imperialist power
structures.78
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Under those governments, though there were fewer indigenous in office, there were not
international concerns about violations of indigenous rights. Martin and Wilmer explain that this
is due to their large presence in the population and ability to “advance their claims both by
participation in ‘normal’ politics,” and Brienen agrees, adding that “when unable to participate in
the political process by voting, have done so by organizing, protesting, and at times, turning to
violence.”79 After the constitution, though, historians have addressed concerns not only about the
indio permitido attitude but also the oppression of the mestizo and non-indigenous population. For
Morales, the opportunity for participation was not enough, and his focus on indigenous rights can
justify “the flouting of certain democratic and legal rules,” creating an opportunity for the former
ruling class to become the “principal victim of racial oppression in the country.” 80
The causation of Morales’s declining popularity and removal from office can be traced to
the 2009 constitution. The document in and of itself is democratic in that in continues to ensure
universal suffrage and civil liberties, but the expansion of executive power introduces an
opportunity to challenge that. One concern with ensuring democracy after the constitution comes
from Morales’s strong connection with his indigenous background. After rising from the minority
to run the country, Morales made sure the document protected the rights of his class—the new
ruling class. Morales is known to put one group of indigenous over others and often claims their
interests as Bolivia’s. Under his government, other indigenous groups and non-indigenous people
were marginalized. 81 This does not support protection of minority rights and thus, does not advance
Bolivian democracy.
Morales’s divisive social politics create a hierarchy of citizens and simply change who the
oppressed citizens are. The increasing racial conflict from the top inspires citizens to see Morales’s
administration as corrupt and does not lead to a sustainable system. 82 Charges of corruption and
tyranny have led to previous revolutionary actions—policies that divide are not progress toward
national sovereignty.
2011 TIPNIS ROAD PROJECT, LAND RIGHTS AND LATIN AMERICAN
DEPENDENCE
Bolivia’s land-locked status presents some issues when trying to encourage trade with
foreign nations. In 2011, Morales’s government began construction on a highway from
Cochabamba to Brazil, funded and built primarily by that nation. 83 The 160-mile highway was
slated to run through the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), but the
affected indigenous groups had not been consulted as required by the 2009 constitution. When
faced with pushback after the 2010 announcement, Morales made his position clear by calling
anyone who opposed him an “enemy of Bolivia” and telling the “so-called defenders of the
environment… that whether they like it or not, we’re going to build this highway and we’re going
to deliver it under my administration.”84
The protests had the desired effect when Morales cancelled construction and declared
TIPNIS as untouchable. He claimed the issue was resolved and praised his own actions, saying,
"This is governing by obeying the people." 85 However, the highway project returned in 2012 with
indigenous consultations after counter protests demanding the road appeared in La Paz. After the
meetings, the government reported that 80 percent of TIPNIS indigenous groups approved of the
road and created a new proposal for an “ecological highway.”86 Morales called this a "triumph of

Graduate Review, Volume 1, 2021

94

Leick

Democracy and Bolivian Sovereignty

representative democracy," even as opposed indigenous continued to protest. 87 No road emerged,
but in 2017, Morales suddenly reversed the “untouchable” action, again opening the door to this
construction.
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 resulted in, among other victories, a return of the land to
the people. In Liberty for Latin America, Alvaro Vargas Llosa posits that “the transition that took
place was not from exclusive property by few private owners to full property by millions of private
owners, but to a symbolic for of property by the peasants, while the state, the entity that embodied
the collective rights of the masses, became the real owner.”88 The main land rights concern that
emerges from the TIPNIS protests centers around the same issue. In 2009, Morales gave
indigenous communities in the area a “provisional title” with collective property rights to
TIPNIS.89 This was not quite the same as his earlier claims that indigenous owned the land, and
he demonstrated the difference with the highway project.
The hierarchical structure of indigenous in Bolivia certainly should be examined as a factor
in the project. Farthing explains the belief differences between highland indigenous’s individual
ownership and the communal structure of lowland groups being complicated by “economic
dependence on escalating resource extraction that places minority rights to territory and
livelihoods in conflict with the majority rights to share in resource rents.” 90 Fabricant and Postero
add that some indigenous communities have differing relationships with resource extraction and
may support projects that improve their access to services. Morales and other TIPNIS advocates
play on the hierarchy by suggesting that the highway would bring modernity and those resisting
are “remaining as savages."91 For the groups who live in the TIPNIS area, though, the park “is the
lung of which we Bolivians breath[e].” 92 This conflict goes back to the idea that, like the cocaleros,
indigenous groups are not one mass body, but a “heterogenous mélange” and in Morales’s Bolivia,
the interests of some groups are placed higher. Thus, “National sovereignty is tied to the
submission of lowland indigenous lands, territories, and bodies.” 93
The “untouchable” label that Morales placed on TIPNIS in 2011 created further problems.
Though it increased protection for potential resource extraction, it also prevented the sustainable
development that indigenous communities in the park relied upon. 94 As public opinion turned
against Morales on the issue, Fabricant and Postero point to a greater mistrust of the president:
“Some even suggested that the intangible declaration was actually a form of spiteful punishment
by the Morales state, a kind of bad-faith invocation of ideals of environmental protection and
sovereignty.”95 Morales’s partisan handling of indigenous issues calls his commitment to
democracy into question.
The TIPNIS project raises another issue for Morales’s platform: that of foreign
involvement within Latin America. Morales has never shied from his ties to Fidel Castro and Hugo
Chavez, but his association with regional governments does not match his pro-sovereignty stance.
As part of the “pink tide” in Latin America, Morales had plenty of leftist regional governments to
forge associations with—and his diplomatic tour before his inauguration started with anti-US
leaders Castro and Chavez. This concerned some inside his own party, who wanted to ensure that
the new government was “uniquely Bolivian” rather than seeming to be a copy of Venezuela or
Chile, led by a disciple of those leaders.96 This attitude was echoed in 2011 when Morales
announced that Brazil was intimately involved with the highway, both in construction and
financing. An opposition leader referred to Brazil as "an imperialist power" making a claim on
Bolivian resources, thought Morales argued that the road would allow more access to trade. 97
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The issue of foreign involvement popped up in Bolivia in the weeks before Morales left
office, when he drew criticism for his response to wildfires sweeping across Latin America.
Though his policies may have been partly to blame, as calls to accept foreign aid in fighting the
fires ramped up, Morales claimed that would be “an affront to national sovereignty.”98 In addition
to facing criticism for this decision, citizens question his overall commitment to his values—slashand-burn clearing of land does not support environmentalism, and neither does a lack of action in
the name of sovereignty.
Just two years after guaranteeing indigenous rights in the constitution, Morales violated
them with the TIPNIS construction. Again, the constitution is not the problem: it is Morales’s
policies. The drawn-out process of the project provided him multiple attempts to rectify and
commit to the protected minority rights—instead he doubled down with the “untouchable” decree,
and its hasty removal in 2017. Evo Morales is not making progress toward maintaining democracy.
This project also needs to pass the test for the promotion of Bolivian sovereignty. Morales’s
attempt to open access to the Atlantic Ocean and rest of the world through Brazil would support
sovereignty, but again his policies do not hold up when pressed. Foreign trade is required but
Brazilian financing of the projects speaks to dependence and is an example of the challenges that
Morales is not able to navigate. The TIPNIS decree, and subsequent action on the project, have
not made progress toward sovereignty or democracy; in fact, they show a decline over time.
This project, like the earlier nationalization of hydrocarbons, was intended to support
Bolivia’s indigenous peoples. In comparison to the widely-supported hydrocarbon decree, this one
had the primarily positive effect on highland indigenous groups of increased access to trade, with
a negative effect on the lowland groups who would be disrupted by the planned route. Again,
Morales’s initial broad base of support resulted in his conflation of highland interests, lowland
interests, and Bolivian interests.
2017 COCA LAW, COCA PRODUCTION, AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION
Morales’s rhetoric during 2005 was strong when he promised to decriminalize coca
farming and blamed citizens of developed nations for “converting it into an addictive substance to
be consumed by a decadent U.S. public.” 99 Once in office, he worked to expand the allowable
production from 12,000 acres to 20,000 acres; he finally succeeded in 2017 when the General Coca
Law (Law 906) replaced Law 1008 and allowed expanded coca production in two regions: 14,300
acres in La Paz and 7,700 in Cochabamba. 100 Yungas farmers were not prohibited from growing
coca under Law 1008—and their larger farms caused conflict even before Morales was
president.101
Morales’s arguments on coca purports to take the side of the cocalero, but the coca
producers represent a “heterogenous mélange of people from different origins and backgrounds”
rather than a unified group. 102 One area of conflict between indigenous groups stems from the
question of why growth is needed in other areas: “The Yungas contend that they are the real
producers of coca for traditional use, arguing that the Chapare crops are destined for use in cocaine
production and narcotrafficking.”103
While there are 17,000 tons of coca produced in the Chapare, the legal market only receives
1,800 tons, meaning that 89 percent of the coca produced in Chapare is not entering the
legal market. In the Yungas of La Paz, on the other hand, 20,600 tons are produced and
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20,091 enter the legal market. According to economist Carlos Hoffman, Morales claims
that controlled legalization of coca is for traditional coca consumption, but the government
will collect an estimated two million dollars in taxes from trafficked coca through the new
law. Around 58% of the total coca produced in Bolivia is legal while the rest goes toward
the drug trade. Producing only legal coca would be prohibitively expensive; it currently
costs 500 dollars per cato, or 10 dollars per kilo, but if fully legalized, the price would drop
greatly. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the Morales administration to control the
legalization of coca because cocaleros will leave the market if there is a dramatic price
decrease.104

Morales has frequently pointed to Bolivian efforts to reduce drug trafficking, but has made
clear that farmers must come first— “‘zero narcotrafficking,’… but not ‘zero coca.’” 105 Law 906
purported to allow the indigenous campesinos to continue producing coca in the Bolivian tradition.
The Bolivian tradition, though, seems to be trafficking.
Under Law 1008, the La Paz Yungas was the primary location for 12,000 acres of legal
coca cultivation—the coca that was used in traditional way by Bolivian nationals.106 In 2004, thenPresident Carlos Mesa allowed a technically-illegal 3,000 acres of coca, “grown for traditional,
personal consumption” in the Chapare with the goal of eradicating the rest, in line with global
interests in the reduction of cocaine. 107 Poulos explains that by conflating all coca production,
Morales is undermining the rights to “ancestral” coca producing zones—and “appeas[ing] foreign
concerns . . . while addressing the needs of his primary constituents in the Chapare.” 108 During
Morales’s presidency, coca production in Bolivia initially increased due to this allowance, but had
been decreasing steadily since 2010, prior to the enaction of increased production laws.109 IMF
data shows Bolivia’s shadow economy to follow a similar downward curve. 110
When Morales took office, the most recent United Nations figures showed Bolivia as the
third largest coca-producing country, with 118 tons in 2004. 111 Morales and his cocalero
sindacatos had been fighting US-led eradication policies for decades, claiming that coca had been
grown in Bolivia for centuries, the international drug trade was not the fault of the cocaleros, and
that eradication policies did not allow farmers to earn a living. In 1990, Robert Collier reported
that after six years of crop substitution, there were fewer than 200 acres of alternate crops. 112 In
response, Morales said ''Crop substitution has been no more than a slogan . . . For the peasant it
has been an attempt at swindling him into eradicating his coca in exchange for some cash, and
seeds for a series of crops that cannot be sold." 113 The harm that this outside influence had on his
country set the stage for Morales’s drive for Bolivian sovereignty.
Since his secretario days, Morales has been able to use rhetoric as a helpful tool. In the
1980s and 1990s, he regularly talked to reporters about the evils of the US Drug Enforcement
Agency, saying “They rule the Chapare. What they say goes. They destroy rural roads, they
commit abuses against the peasant community, they stage illegal raids on homes . . . and they even
rape;”114 as well as threatening violence if their policies remained. 115 In the months prior to his
2005 election, he repeatedly brought up US involvement in his previous campaign, when the US
Ambassador drove support for Morales after publicly criticizing him. 116 Brienan points to the
efficacy of this strategy, trying to “unify the masses to appeal to their sense of indignation over
injustices—real and imagined—suffered by Bolivians at the hands of outsiders.”117 By painting
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the actions of the United States as violent, anti-indigenous, and anti-Bolivia, Morales convinces
his constituents that sovereignty, not globalism, is the answer.
Morales’s coca stance does support sovereignty—Bolivia is creating a place in the world
economy on its own terms. By speaking of his commitment to global norms while failing to
implement them or actively working against them in his own policies, Morales is refusing to give
in to foreign demands. So long as there is a global coca market, Bolivian campesinos can make a
profit. The foreign attempts at replacement crops were not intended for local market, so this is not
hurting sustainability by preventing food production. Coca enters the global market in the same
way that quinoa or cardamom would.
The coca stance, however, does face opposition from some in the country, particularly
those who grow coca for traditional purposes and do not want to reputation as drug traffickers.
Their narrative speaks to the importance of voice in Bolivia. As with the TIPNIS project, this
alternate indigenous narrative is missing from the government’s consideration. The significant
number of people in the country who do not want coca being produced for the cocaine trade,
provide another example of Morales promoting the interest of one constituency as the interests of
all Bolivia. The top-down ruling on Bolivian interests, silencing large groups of stakeholders, does
not make progress towards democracy.
CONCLUSION
The 2009 Constitution limits presidents to two terms in office, but the Bolivian courts
determined that only the term beginning with its reign actually counted toward the total; thus
Morales was eligible for reelection in 2014. He won that election with more than 60 percent of the
vote, compared to just shy of 25 percent for his closest challenger. 118 A strong economy helped
Morales despite policies that were more decisive, but his MAS party took a hit, losing ground in
Congress.119 This type of action, an almost immediate subversion of the new document of the
people, suggests it may be what Sebastian Edwards calls an “aspirational constitution, based upon
the present society’s goals and ambitions.” 120
In 2016, Morales tried to extend his term again, seeking a removal of term limits from the
constitution. Though a referendum failed, the court again sided with Morales, overturning the
result saying that “denying his candidacy was an infringement of his human rights.” 121 For
Morales, this potential infringement was a bigger challenge to democratic ideals than overturning
a referendum. More challenges to democracy came in the election of 2019, where Morales
narrowly avoided a runoff election, but the Organization of American States refused to certify the
election based on the presence of “deliberate actions that sought to manipulate the results of the
election” and “grave irregularities.” 122 It was in the midst of this disputed election that Morales
left Bolivia in late 2019.
The new president, conservative Jeanine Áñez signaled a departure from Morales in her
first days in office. She has now banned "’personality cults’" in Bolivia's institutions” and more,
Frida Ghitis explains:
She alienated the indigenous population . . . [when] she raised an outsized Bible and
declared that she was "returning the Bible to the palace." Áñez, a light-skinned blond
woman, made things worse by naming an all-white cabinet. Following an outcry, she added
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an indigenous minister, but by then Morales's loyalists had branded her "la mujer teñida"
("the dyed woman") or, simply, "the whore.”123

While his government in recent years has been called authoritarian, Morales equates Añez’s
actions to a coming dictatorship after years of his democracy. 124 With the relative stability of his
term, it remains to be seen whether the Añez government results in continuity or a return to the
neoliberalism of the years prior.
Evo Morales served as president of Bolivia for nearly fourteen years, after more than two
decades as an indigenous and cocalero activist. When he took the leadership position, he accepted
the responsibility to serve both Bolivia and her indigenous people—to bring Bolivia democracy
and national sovereignty. Morales’s version of democracy, though, is intertwined with
sovereignty, and centered on increasing the rights of the indigenous peoples who brought him to
notoriety. The difference between his view and a more standard definition is the place where he
comes up short.
Through the examination of policies enacted during each of his terms, it is clear that
although Bolivian systems have moved toward democracy and national sovereignty under
Morales, his own actions undermined national progress. In advocating for his indigenous rights,
Morales did more harm than good by the end of his presidency. His actions did not support his
stated aims of democracy and sovereignty, and his commitment to his indigenous identity was a
major factor. The MAS government with Morales at the helm made some progress, but the lack of
underlying democratic structure gave him enough power to undo it. This linear examination of his
policies allows a clear demonstration of the causes of his decline. Morales was closest to his goals
when leaning toward his activist roots in the early days of his presidency—when he represented
those at the bottom of Bolivia. The longer he stayed at the top, the more he ruled from there.
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